As maritime security concerns escalate in the Asia-Pacific region, the need for enhanced cooperation between regional naval forces becomes increasingly critical. Taiwan, situated just a short distance from the Philippines, shares not only a geographical proximity but also common interests in maintaining peace and stability in the surrounding waters. Given the evolving security dynamics in the region, it is imperative that the Taiwan Coast Guard and Navy collaborate more closely with the Philippines Navy. This partnership could greatly enhance maritime security through shared patrols, intelligence exchange, and joint training initiatives.

Geographical and Strategic Context

Taiwan’s close proximity to the Philippines—approximately 300 kilometers at its nearest point—creates a natural partnership opportunity for maritime security efforts. The waters between these two nations are vital trade routes and rich fishing grounds, making them susceptible to illegal activities such as smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal fishing. These challenges not only threaten national security but also impact the livelihoods of local communities that rely on fishing and maritime trade.

With the increasing assertiveness of regional actors, particularly China, in the South China Sea, both Taiwan and the Philippines face mounting pressure to protect their sovereignty and maritime interests. A collaborative approach to maritime security would not only bolster their individual capacities but also signal to external actors that both nations are committed to safeguarding their waters and the rights of their citizens.

Building on Existing Initiatives

In recent years, Taiwan has taken significant steps to support the Philippines Coast Guard through various initiatives, including Chinese language training. This training is not merely a gesture of goodwill; it serves a practical purpose by enhancing communication and operational efficiency during joint missions. However, the potential for cooperation extends far beyond language training. Joint patrols and coordinated responses to maritime incidents represent a crucial next step in strengthening ties between the two nations.

The Philippines Navy and Coast Guard have expressed their interest in enhancing bilateral relations with Taiwan. By conducting joint maritime exercises, both countries can improve their operational readiness and foster a deeper understanding of each other’s capabilities and tactics. Such exercises would not only enhance the skills of personnel but also build trust and camaraderie between the forces.

Expanding Joint Patrols

One of the most effective ways to enhance maritime security is through joint patrols. By coordinating patrols in shared waters, Taiwan and the Philippines can increase their visibility and deterrent effect against illegal activities. Joint operations would allow for the sharing of resources, including vessels and surveillance technology, thus maximizing the operational capabilities of both nations.

Additionally, joint patrols can facilitate the exchange of intelligence regarding maritime threats. Information-sharing protocols should be established to ensure timely communication about illegal activities, potential threats, and environmental concerns. This collaboration can lead to more effective responses and the ability to tackle challenges that transcend national borders.

Addressing Common Threats

The maritime domain is fraught with challenges that require collaborative efforts to address effectively. Issues such as illegal fishing not only threaten the economic stability of both Taiwan and the Philippines but also jeopardize the sustainability of marine ecosystems. By working together, both nations can develop comprehensive strategies to combat illegal fishing and protect their shared resources.

As climate change continues to impact maritime environments, joint initiatives for environmental protection and disaster response become crucial. Collaborative efforts in these areas can enhance resilience and ensure the long-term health of marine ecosystems.

Political Will and Regional Stability

The success of closer cooperation between Taiwan and the Philippines hinges on political will from both governments. Diplomatic engagement and high-level discussions can pave the way for formalizing agreements that outline the framework for joint operations and information sharing. Emphasizing the importance of regional stability and mutual security will be key in garnering support for such initiatives.

Strengthening ties with Taiwan can provide the Philippines with a strategic partner in an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape. As regional dynamics shift, fostering robust relationships with neighboring nations becomes essential for collective security. The geographic and strategic proximity of Taiwan and the Philippines presents a unique opportunity for enhanced cooperation in maritime security. Building on existing initiatives such as language training, both nations can extend their collaboration to include joint patrols, intelligence sharing, and coordinated responses to maritime challenges. By working together, Taiwan and the Philippines can not only safeguard their maritime interests but also contribute to regional stability and security in the Asia-Pacific. The time is ripe for both nations to seize this opportunity and forge a stronger partnership that reflects their shared commitment to protecting their waters and ensuring the well-being of their citizens.

The post Enhancing Maritime Security: Closer Cooperation Between Taiwan Coast Guard and Navy with the Philippines Navy first appeared on Zamboanga .

A stretch of uninhabited, low-lying reefs in the South China Sea is rapidly turning into a volatile hotspot between China and the Philippines, undermining recent efforts to ease tensions in one of the world’s most crucial waterways.

In the past week, Chinese and Philippine vessels have experienced multiple collisions and standoffs near Sabina Shoal, a contested atoll located just 86 miles from the Philippines’ west coast and 745 miles from China. China asserts sovereignty over nearly the entire South China Sea, despite an international ruling that disputes this claim.

These aggressive encounters occurred only weeks after Beijing and Manila reached a temporary agreement to reduce escalating tensions that had built up over the summer at another nearby reef, where China’s assertive actions had raised concerns throughout the region and in Washington, a defense ally of the Philippines.

The renewed tension in the South China Sea is likely to be discussed during meetings between US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during Sullivan’s visit to China this week.

After a particularly violent incident at Second Thomas Shoal in June, where Chinese coast guard personnel threatened Filipino soldiers and damaged their boats, officials from both nations met to discuss de-escalation.

For a time, it seemed tensions were easing, but this calm was short-lived.

On August 19, in the early hours, coast guard ships from China and the Philippines collided near Sabina Shoal. The Philippines claimed that Chinese vessels rammed its ships, causing significant damage, while Beijing accused the Philippines of being at fault.

Then, on Sunday afternoon, another confrontation occurred, with the Philippines alleging that China rammed and sprayed water from cannons at a vessel from its fisheries bureau during an encounter with eight Chinese ships, including a warship from the People’s Liberation Army Navy. China countered that the Philippine ship “refused to accept control” from a Chinese coast guard vessel and “deliberately collided” with it.

The next day, during another tense encounter, the Philippines reported that China had deployed an “excessive force” of 40 ships, including three PLA Navy vessels, to obstruct two Philippine Coast Guard boats. In response, Beijing claimed it took “control measures” against the Philippine ships that had “intruded” into waters near Sabina Shoal.

Experts suggest that Sabina Shoal is quickly becoming a new hotspot in an already contentious region, where a misstep could lead to significant conflict.

“All signs indicate that this is emerging as a third flashpoint,” following the Second Thomas Shoal and the Scarborough Shoal to the north, said Collin Koh, a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

Koh noted that Manila is keen to avoid a repeat of the Scarborough Shoal incident, which China seized in 2012 after a prolonged standoff and has since occupied.

Conversely, China aims to prevent another situation like the one at Second Thomas Shoal, where the Philippines deliberately grounded a World War II-era ship in 1999 to assert its claim over the reef, maintaining a small contingent of marines there.

The violent incidents around Second Thomas Shoal earlier this summer occurred as Beijing sought to obstruct Manila’s efforts to resupply its soldiers stationed on the aging BRP Sierra Madre.

The post Tensions rising in West Philippine Sea first appeared on Zamboanga .

re published from KIMS periscope with permission from author

Since the end of 2023, China has been scaling up the regularity, the diversity and the degree of violence of its action against the Philippines, using either sonars and surface sonic weapons, pointing floodlight projectors, jamming Filipino ships sensors, GPS and comms, employing helicopters and go-fast ships as means of intimidation, firing double-barreled water cannons at full power and point-blank range against fragile and unarmed wooden supply ships, and even, more recently, painted its maritime militia vessels to the China Coast Guard’s colors in order to blur the lines.

But is that anything new given the pattern of China’s behavior ever since the 1970s and 1980s, like when it fired anti-aircraft guns at unarmed Vietnamese soldiers stranded on Johnson South Reef, or when it built “weather stations” in the Spratlys in 1988, and fishermen shelters at Mischief Reef in 1995, both low-tide elevations that were in turn transformed into full-fledge naval and air bases just twenty years later, right after Xi Jinping promised they would be neither reclaimed nor militarized. And we should not forget the two major incidents that occurred in the EEZ of Vietnam back in 2014 and 2019 or the surprise takeover of Scarborough Shoal in 2012. Other actions have been witnessed in the Taiwan Strait, around the Senkaku Islands and in the Yellow Sea, in fact all over its near seas’ perimeter.

Over the years, experts have been giving a variety of reasons to explain such behavior, whether it is to control natural resources such as fish, polymetallic nodules and oil and gas, or to create a buffer zone in order to keep the United States away from a vital commercial artery, to secure a space to conduct military exercises, or to dilute the submarines harbored at Yulin naval base in Hainan, secure a future invasion of Taiwan, to (re)establish a regional predominance or prevent a return of the so-called “century of humiliation”. Let’s explore some of these to try understand what exactly is behind China’s aggressiveness.

A complicated link between China and Taiwan

To begin with, let’s address Taiwan that seems to have been more and more at the center of China’s attention over the years. Even though some “wolf warrior” Chinese diplomats like the Chinese ambassador to France, H.E. Lu Shaye, pretend that Taiwan has been part of China since Jesus Christ, the reality is somewhat very different and it is a fact that the first ethnic Chinese to land in Taiwan, aside from the Pescadores archipelago, were laborers recruited by the European colonial powers (Netherland, Spain, England, Portugal) to work in the plantations that had been established there.

It is important to notice that Taiwan has not been occupied by China before 1683 following the defeat of the Tungning kingdom, Ming loyalists and pirates that had previously defeated the Dutch and settled on the island after being evicted from the mainland. That same year, Taiwan also appeared for the first time on an official Chinese map, but it did not refrain Emperor Kangxi himself to see Taiwan merely as a “ball of mud beyond the pale of civilization”, unworthy of his attention”.

For the most part of the Chinese presence, underpopulation and constant conflicts with the aboriginal population plagued the authorities. Even in 1895, despite numerous campaigns from the successive governors to fight the Taiwanese tribes and open the countryside to settlers’ penetration, only half of Taiwan was controlled by the Chinese government at the time of Japanese invasion, a reality that had already been made clear during the Mudan incident of 1871, when the governor told the Japanese forces that the incident had taken place in an area that was out of his control.

Another major element to take into account is that between 1922 and 1942, when the Chinese communist forces were based in Yan’an, their position was that Taiwan (and Korea) was a separate nation that they wanted to help to get free from the Japanese occupation, a position confirmed by Mao Zedong himself in 1937 in an interview with American journalist Edward Snow. A position that was to change dramatically following the defeat of the Guomindang and its retreat to the island.

A non-existing historic legitimacy in the south sea

Regarding the South China Sea, called “South Sea” in China prior to the 20th century, and “Champa Sea” for centuries before that by most of its neighbors, we should remember that all maps published by China until 1932 mentioned Hainan as its southernmost point, it is only after the French took control of and claimed the Paracels (1932) and later the Spratlys (1933), that the Chinese authorities started claiming these same areas, pushing their southernmost point from Hainan to the Paracels, later to the Spratlys and now all the way to James Shoal, a submerged reef 22 meters below water, and updated their maps to accompany these new claims. Still, until the 1990s, all the South China Sea features’ names on Chinese maps were mere word-by-word translations of English names, even though China pretends it has first discovered and named both archipelago’s features since ancient times.

But these claims were empty as China, as a country, had never specifically patrolled, occupied, populated, exploited or developed (building structures and/or infrastructure) any of the now disputed maritime features, before at least the early 20th century for the Paracels and the 1950s for the Spratlys. The only regular Chinese presence that existed over the centuries was that of fishermen from Hainan and eventually from Guangdong or Fujian that occupied from time to time a handful of features, exclusively in the Paracels, in order to rest, collect turtle eggs, replenish water at some of the rare drinkable wells, and prey the goddess of the sea. A reality demonstrated by the fact that until the late 19th century, the favorite way to cross the South China Sea was to do so along the coasts, using cabotage, the “Dangerous Ground” area being generally avoided for its numerous low tide elevations.

It is telling that in 1938, Mr. Wang Gong Da, then director of the influential Peiping News, wrote the following to the Foreign Affairs Secretary: “The Spokesperson of the Foreign Affairs said that a protest was prepared if it was proven that the nine islands (the Spratlys) were part of the Xisha (the Paracels). Don’t make a diplomatic blunder, these islands are not part of Xisha. Triton Island is the southernmost part of our territory. South of Triton Island, there is no connection with the Chinese territory. Our so-called experts, geographers, and Navy officers are a shame to our country”.

It is also a fact that until 1949, the communist party of China had made no claim whatsoever on either the Paracels or the Spratlys. It seems that it is only after the forces of the Guomindang had published in 1948 their map displaying the then eleven-dash line, that the Communist leadership decided to incorporate all of the nationalist’s claims when declaring the New China, in order to deprive them of any legitimacy and to rally the population a significant portion of which they knew was not supporting them all heartedly. But there is a major difference between claiming and acting, and following the takeover of Hainan, it would take about twenty-five years before communist China move on to cease the whole of the Paracels and another 14 years after that for the Spratlys, following the 1974 and 1988 naval battles between mainland China and either South Vietnam or reunified Vietnam.

In more recent times, neither the Republic of China (Taiwan) nor the People’s Republic of China (Beijing) have ever published the coordinates of the dashes, even in the 2009’ PRC declaration to the UN, whom number has changed over time (eleven, then nine, then ten dashes), and which shape has moved over time, nor have they made clear what they claimed within the dashed line. Indeed, there are about seven or more different versions circulating between the various ministries, administrations, think tanks and even propaganda movies such as “Born to fly” (2023), none having been made the official one. A dashed line that was made null and void following the ratification of UNCLOS, as was made perfectly clear by the decision of the PCA in 2016 in the Philippines v. China case.

The same goes for the notion of historic rights (at the exception of historic bays and traditional fishing grounds), a rather recent notion as it was put forward by the Republic of China (ROC) only in 1993, and that the People’s Republic of China copied in the late 1990s and early 2000s, in parallel of a number of techniques such as the use of vague, pseudo-legal, wording such as “waters under China’s jurisdiction”, “adjacent waters” and other terms, and a failed attempt to draw archipelagic baselines around low-tide elevations, far over-stretching a concept that can only be applied by archipelagic countries such as South Pacific nations like Vanuatu and Micronesia.

A limited interest for the natural resources

It has been said in various occasions and by different experts that China might be motivated by the access to the natural resources it so desperately needed with a population avid for fresh sea food and with an ever-growing consumption of sea-sourced proteins (from 5 to 35 kg per person per year between 1960 and 2020), including fish, giant clams, squids, and sea cucumbers. Even though these trends might be true, it is also a fact that these same needs are being already met by the growing long distance fishing fleets roaming the Pacific and Indian oceans, and by the national aquaculture industry that now accounts for 60 million tons or 82% of the total production.

The situation seems to be the same about oil and gas and it is a fact that despite seemingly overly positive estimations by a United Nations body in 1969, exploration and production has not boomed in most of the area of the South China Sea ever since, except for Malaysia in the Luconia Shoals area and for the Philippines (in a much more limited fashion). Indeed, after the short lived Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking agreement between China, the Philippines and Vietnam (2005-2008), and a later attempt between China and the Philippines under Duterte didn’t conclude either after China refused that the contract indicates Reed Bank as a Filipino territory. Moreover, after the 2014 and 2019 incidents in the Vietnamese EEZ, China has experienced much more success in its own EEZ with the Kaipingnan oilfield, south of Shenzhen (2023), and with the Bohai 26-6 oilfield east of Tianjin in the Bohai Sea (2024).

Also, China is currently moving fast toward an electrification of individual and collective mobility (including the very first high speed rail network in the world), has invested massively in solar power plants and wind farms, the development of the national energy industry, and seriously reduced its dependency on the traditional supply lines from the Middle-East for its supply of oil and gas through the increased national production and by building various infrastructures in cooperation with Russia, on top of the development of the Myanmar and Pakistan corridors.

All of these elements plead for a reduced interest and dependency, but other non-economic interests might actually take prevalence over them, including the desire or perceived need to build a buffer zone, keeping the US and other QUAD actors at a safe distance, to reinforce its influence over its neighbors, or to create a space for its submarines to safely “dilute” before reaching the Pacific Ocean.

A complicated economic situation

The current economic and social situation in China is particularly difficult, between industrial over capacities and an unsustainable growth target, with regions under pressure from the central authorities to invest in infrastructure projects, often leading to ego projects including ghost towns for up to two million people, highways to nowhere, airports with no flights and giant train stations with no passengers, in order to support the economy, maintain the growth target and provide jobs. Successively, the authorities have in fact severely damaged the tourism and hospitality industries, as well as the video game industry, the private tutoring industry (two million jobs suppressed), and the construction industry with all associated sectors, all the while experiencing a halt to foreign investments and the beginning of divestment from major industrial and technological groups, a succession of stock market crashes, with millions of people either out of a job, with their savings whipped out, or forced to repay loans for an apartment or a house that they will never be delivered.

Some state sponsored projects such as the national high speed rail network, a true matter of national pride, are now severely indebted, and the regions supporting them with it, with too many stations being unprofitable and sometimes unused, and the production and maintenance of an over-large fleet, draining local, regional and national stakeholders’ finances with no light at the end of the tunnel so far. Finally, it is important to remind the reader that despite thirty years of constant double-digit growth and a near-daily supply of world records, it is a reality, soberly reminded by former Prime Minister Li Keqiang in 2020 that half of the population, 600 million people, barely make ends meet with 140$ monthly income when even Moldova, Europe’s poorest country, reaches 552$ average monthly salary.

A growing aversion to political instability

In conclusion, it seems clear from the above that not only China has no basis to claim either or both of the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, or Taiwan and the Senkaku islands for what matters, but that it has completely reversed its policies after 1949, following its victory over the Guomindang, seemingly in order to gather the nation and deprive its adversary of any legitimacy after their retreat to Taiwan.

A lack of legitimacy that has been countered by the constant need of the Chinese authorities, especially after the disasters of the great leap forward, the one hundred flowers campaign, the three anti and five anti campaigns and the cultural revolution, to show the determination and resolve of the state, to accomplish the national rejuvenation and reunification, and the end of the “century of humiliation”. As such, I believe that China could not care any less about both Vietnam and the Philippines, that it seems to see as unfortunate collateral damage in its vast and ever-growing campaign of asymmetric warfare.

A Chinese maritime lawyer with whom I discussed with last year told me about incidents at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal: “The issue that we have in China is that we have this vision that what we receive from our ancestors, no matter good or bad, we have to uphold and preserve otherwise we lose the protection of heaven;” and in the case of the Chinese authorities, it would mean losing face toward the population”, therefore risking political instability, which would threaten the grip of the communist party of China on the country, an unacceptable scenario for both the military, security and political authorities.

Nevertheless, Xi Jinping has succeeded in “turning the tides” and make an opportunity out of a major obstacle by using a seemingly unsolvable situation to divert the attention of the population from the economic and social difficulties, unite them (by force if need be) behind the communist party of China, allocate part of the excess steel production to the production of new corvettes, frigates, destroyers and aircraft carriers, on top of logistics and support, and amphibious vessels, constituting long term assets for the nation, in turn creating new jobs in industry to produce, maintain and modernize the ships, but also in the navy to crew the ships, and in the defense industry.

Now, we must hope that the scenarios of a major move by China in either 2025, 2027 or 2030 will not materialize, and that Xi Jinping or whomever takes his place after him, will not take the excuse of the ongoing difficulties to launch a major confrontation with the US and/or the West to reunite the people behind a common goal of taking Taiwan back, no matter the cost, surely a grueling scenario that, based on scenarios from Bloomberg, would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world.

• Author BIO

Benjamin Blandin is a PhD student in geopolitics at the Paris Catholic University. He was previously a Senior Consultant in strategy at Airbus Defence and Space and consulting firms such as Accenture, Deloitte and Capgemini. He graduated from Lyon Business School (EM Lyon) in strategy consulting, University Paris II (ISAD) in geostrategy and Paris 8 (IFG) in geopolitics. Benjamin Blandin is a former auditor of the Paris Military Academy (IHEDN) and Naval Academy (CESM).

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The post What does China really want in the SCS? first appeared on Zamboanga .

On August 2nd, the armed forces of the Philippines announced that they had carried out their first-ever joint military exercises with Japan in the South China Sea. The drills took place within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, marking a significant step in the growing defense cooperation between the two nations. The joint exercises are seen as a strategic move to reinforce regional security and stability in the face of escalating tensions in the contested waters of the South China Sea.

The exercises, which were conducted in the vicinity of the strategic waterway, involved two vessels from each side. The participating forces engaged in a series of training activities aimed at enhancing their interoperability and coordination. According to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the exercises included communication drills, coordinated maneuvering, and a photographic exercise. These activities mirror similar exercises the Philippines regularly conducts with the United States as part of their longstanding defense alliance.

In a statement released by the AFP, the joint exercises with Japan demonstrated the two countries’ commitment to upholding a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region. The exercises are part of broader efforts to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, a concept that emphasizes respect for international law, freedom of navigation, and regional cooperation. By coming together for these drills, the Philippines and Japan aim to strengthen their defense ties and enhance their ability to respond to shared security challenges in the region.

The decision to hold joint exercises in the South China Sea sends a clear message to other regional actors, particularly China, which has asserted expansive territorial claims in the disputed waters. Both the Philippines and Japan have been vocal critics of China’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea, where Beijing has built and militarized artificial islands in defiance of international norms. The joint exercises serve as a visible display of solidarity between Manila and Tokyo in the face of these challenges.

Japan’s participation in military exercises in the South China Sea is significant due to its status as a major regional power and a close ally of the United States. Japan has been increasingly active in promoting a rules-based order and maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, aligning with its strategic interests. The joint exercises with the Philippines represent another step in Japan’s efforts to deepen its security cooperation with regional partners and contribute to regional stability.

The successful completion of the joint exercises between the Philippines and Japan underscores the growing defense ties between the two countries. As both nations navigate complex security challenges in the region, cooperation and coordination between their armed forces will be crucial in safeguarding their shared interests and promoting peace and stability in the South China Sea. The exercises also serve as a reminder of the importance of regional partnerships in addressing common security concerns and upholding the rules-based international order.

The post Philippines and Japan Conduct First Joint Exercises in the South China Sea first appeared on Zamboanga .

Only 3% of Filipinos were against asserting our rights in the West Philippine Sea.
The survey also asked respondents what measures the Philippines should implement in the West Philippine Sea to strengthen its external defense. Respondents were allowed to choose two answers from six options. The majority of Filipinos (51%) favored reinforcing alliance and elevating partnerships by conducting joint patrols and military exercises with allies, friends, and partners. Half of Filipinos (50%) also agreed to support the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to protect our territory and marine resources in our Exclusive Economic Zone.

Consequently, the same survey also asked Filipinos to identify the entities they want the Philippines to continue working with in asserting its rights in the West Philippine Sea. They were given 11 options and were allowed to choose up to three answers. A significant 74% of Filipinos said that they want the Philippines to continue working with the United States while 44% said Japan, 41% Canada, and 36% Australia. Only 5% of Filipinos responded that they want the Philippines to work with China in asserting its rights in the West Philippine Sea.

The post PULSE ASIA SURVEY: 8 OF 10 PINOYS AGREE GOV’T MUST CONTINUE TO ASSERT MARITIME RIGHTS, PROTECT TERRITORY IN WPS first appeared on Zamboanga .

MAKATI CITY – International think tank Stratbase ADR Institute calls for more joint patrols in the West Philippine Sea between the Philippines and like-minded countries, amid continuous illegal and aggressive actions of China inthe area. Stratbase President Professor Dindo Manhit made the statement during the biggest West Philippine Sea forum on Friday in celebration of the 8th anniversary of the arbitral award, which rejected China’s expansive nine-dash line and upheld the Philippine position that China has no lawful claims to areas covered by the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf.

In a statement, Manhit urged like-minded countries to “reinforce cooperation and elevate partnerships by conducting joint patrols and military exercises”. “Let us likewise support the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to protect our territory and maritime resources in the West Philippine Sea. These measures, the Institute believes, send a strong message that the Philippines is not alone. Those who attempt to circumvent their obligations and behave aggressively will not be tolerated by the international community. We will not waver in our determination and commitment,” Manhit said.

During the conference, at least 26 countries, through their ambassadors and their representatives, gathered together and reaffirmed their support on the 2016 Arbitral Award. Among the countries who reaffirmed their support to the award during the conference were Australia, Canada, France, Japan, and the United States. Also present were the ambassadors of Austria, Bangladesh, the European Union, Germany, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, and Vietnam, and representatives from Brunei, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Manhit emphasized the importance of the arbitral ruling and cooperation with like-minded states amid China’s continuous aggression in the West Philippine Sea. “This year, we witnessed actions – the most aggressive by far — performed against our fellow Filipinos at sea. Our troops, fisherfolk, and vessels encountered several attempts to block rotation and reprovision missions, numerous occasions of firing of water cannons, and an alarming number of collisions and near-collisions… Our boats may be damaged, and our lives may continuously be at risk, but our will to defend the West Philippine Sea has never been stronger,” Manhit said. “We have the whole of Philippine society behind us as we assert our rights in the West Philippine Sea, and the support of like-minded states in the community of nations. These give us hope and confidence that we will be able to safeguard our national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economic rights in the West Philippine Sea. Our collective efforts, whether big or small, have a great impact on our collective pursuit of security and stability,” he added.

Also present during the conference on Wednesday were National Security Adviser Eduardo Ano, Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro, and heads of the Philippine Navy, Philippine Air Force, and the Philippine Coast Guard. Foreign and local security and foreign policy experts also joined in the discussions. “The legally binding arbitral ruling is clear: the West Philippine Sea is ours. It is the responsibility of all parties to abide by and recognize their obligations under international law… The position and the direction of our government are firm: we will not yield. We will never yield. We will be steadfast,” he maintained. “As we commemorate our victory today, we invite our friends, allies, and partners who also value the rule of law to reinforce cooperation. This, the Institute believes, sends a strong message to those who attempt to circumvent their obligations and behave aggressively. We will not waver in our determination and commitment,” Manhit said.

The post Think Tank calls for more joint patrols in West Philippine Sea. first appeared on Zamboanga .

MAKATI CITY – Key government leaders, ambassadors, and experts are coming together in the biggest West Philippine Sea Conference of 2024 to celebrate the 8th anniversary of the Arbitral ruling that dismissed China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea.

Organized by the Stratbase ADR Institute, in partnership with the Australian Embassy in the Philippines and the US Embassy in the Philippines, the event will be held on July 12 in Makati City.

Expected to attend the conference are the ambassadors of United States, Australia, Canada, France, and Japan to the Philippines. The National Security Council, top military officials from the Philippine Navy, Philippine Air Force, Philippine Coast Guard, and the Presidential Office for Maritime Concerns are also expected to speak during the event. 

Stratbase Institute President Professor Dindo Manhit said, in light of the continuous aggressive and coercive actions of China in the West Philippine Sea, it is very timely to discuss and exchange views on the strategic value of the arbitral tribunal ruling, especially in maintaining a rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific.   

“The Arbitral Award accorded to the Philippines by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016 underscored the importance of the rules-based international order. It brought to the forefront of global discussions the efforts of the Philippines to defend its national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economic rights in the West Philippine Sea,” Manhit explained.

Manhit emphasized that it is of utmost importance that Filipinos come together and strengthen the country’s sovereignty in the area.

“Confronted with asymmetric security challenges, the Philippines remains steadfast in its stance, employing a whole-of-society approach to asserting its rights in the West Philippine Sea. The current administration’s firm pronouncements are complemented by the military’s efforts to boost external defense capabilities through the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept,” Manhit said.

“Moreover, civil society plays an active role through civilian missions in the West Philippine Sea and an assertive transparency strategy, publicizing incidents that undermine the rules-based international order,” he added.

The Stratbase President also noted the significance of having like-minded partners stand beside the Philippines in upholding the rules-based international order in the West Philippine Sea.

“The firm stance and concrete steps taken by the Philippines to safeguard its rights has inspired renewed confidence in the international community. Like-minded partners such as the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, France, and the European Union among others continue to stand shoulder-to-shoulder as part of collective efforts to ensure security, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific,” Manhit said.

“The Arbitral Award serves as a reminder of the Philippines’ victory in upholding its sovereign rights and the enduring strength of the rules-based international order. Underscoring the ongoing challenges and the need for sustained vigilance and collective action, renewing the shared commitment to maritime security among all participants forges stronger partnerships in exploring innovative strategies to safeguard common interests in the Indo-Pacific,” he pointed out.

The post KEY GOV’T LEADERS, AMBASSADORS, EXPERTS TO JOIN PH’S BIGGEST WEST PH SEA CONFERENCE OF 2024 first appeared on Zamboanga .

Military Political Analyst

Makati, Manila

lukeallenmanila@journalist.com

The Philippines has taken a significant step in asserting its maritime sovereignty by officially submitting a claim to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) announced that detailed documentation was filed to establish the nation’s exclusive rights over an extended continental shelf off its western coast, encompassing parts of the resource-rich West Philippine Sea.

This move aims to secure sovereign rights under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) over the Spratly Islands, a strategically vital and resource-abundant area. Several countries, including China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan, are currently overlapping their claims over the Spratlys.

Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. underscored the Philippines’ unwavering commitment to safeguarding its maritime entitlements in a statement. “This filing is a clear testament to our resolute determination to uphold and defend our sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the West Philippine Sea,” Locsin declared. “We are confident that the CLCS will act in accordance with international law and acknowledge our rightful claims.”

The Philippines’ claim is supported by substantial scientific and technical data, demonstrating that the continental shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines, as allowed by UNCLOS. This extension is not only crucial for the Philippines’ energy security and economic development but also holds potential benefits for the international community, including access to the region’s extensive underwater resources, such as potential oil and natural gas reserves.

China, which claims nearly the entire West Philippine Sea through its controversial nine-dash line, has previously dismissed similar claims by other nations. Beijing’s aggressive stance and extensive island-building activities in the disputed waters have heightened regional tensions. However, the Philippines is hopeful that international law and diplomatic efforts will help resolve these disputes peacefully.

Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan, which also have claims in the area, are closely observing the situation. The overlapping claims have historically led to diplomatic friction and occasional confrontations at sea. However, Manila remains optimistic, reiterating its commitment to international legal processes as a means to strengthen its position and promote peaceful resolution of disputes.

Submitting to the CLCS is part of the Philippines’ broader strategy to assert its maritime rights. This includes a landmark ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016 invalidating China’s expansive West Philippine Sea claims. The UN in 2012 also confirmed Benham Rise, which is off the Philippines’ east coast and not under dispute with China, as part of the Philippines’ extended continental shelf. Although China has refused to recognize the tribunal’s decision, it has bolstered the Philippines’ legal stance.

As the CLCS begins reviewing the Philippines’ submission, the international community will be watching closely. The outcome could have far-reaching implications for Southeast Asia’s geopolitical landscape and the ongoing South China Sea disputes.

For now, the Philippines remains steadfast in its pursuit of international recognition of its maritime boundaries, seeking to ensure that its national interests are protected and its sovereign rights respected.

The post Philippines Seeks UN Confirmation of Vast Continental Seabed Rights first appeared on Zamboanga .

Military Political Analyst

Makati, Manila

lukeallenmanila@journalist.com

Tensions in the West Philippine Sea escalated dramatically this week as the Philippines accused the Chinese Coast Guard of obstructing a critical medical evacuation operation. The incident occurred near the Second Thomas Shoal, a contentious Spratly Islands area where a grounded Philippine naval vessel serves as a strategic outpost.

According to the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), the incident unfolded during the medical evacuation of a soldier from the BRP Sierra Madre. This dilapidated World War II-era ship has been stationed at the shoal to assert the Philippines’ territorial claims. The soldier was reportedly suffering from a severe medical condition requiring immediate evacuation.

A video released by the PCG captured the dramatic and dangerous scene. Chinese inflatable speedboats can be seen aggressively maneuvering around the Philippine vessels, effectively blocking the transfer operation. The footage shows the speedboats bumping into the Philippine ships, creating an agitated and dangerous situation.

In a press briefing, PCG spokesman Jay Tarriela condemned the actions of the Chinese vessels, labeling them as “barbaric and inhumane.” He emphasized the humanitarian nature of the operation, noting that the Chinese Coast Guard had been fully informed about the medical emergency. “Despite our clear communication that this was a medical evacuation, we were harassed and obstructed in a manner that endangered lives,” Tarriela stated. “Such behavior is unacceptable and goes against the principles of international maritime law and human decency.”

The Philippine government has lodged a formal diplomatic protest against China, calling for accountability and stressing the need for adherence to international law. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) issued a strongly worded statement, accusing China of “inhumane and aggressive actions” that put the lives of Filipino personnel at risk. “This incident underscores the urgent need for China to respect the rights of other nations and to act responsibly in the West Philippine Sea,” the DFA declared.

China, however, has denied any wrongdoing. In a statement from the Chinese Embassy in Manila, Beijing reiterated its claim over the entirety of the Spratly Islands, including the Second Thomas Shoal. The statement accused the Philippines of conducting unauthorized activities in what China considers its territorial waters and defended the actions of the Chinese Coast Guard as “necessary measures to uphold sovereignty and maritime order.”

The Second Thomas Shoal, known as Ayungin Shoal in the Philippines and Ren’ai Jiao in China, has long been a flashpoint in the dispute. In 1999, the Philippines deliberately grounded the BRP Sierra Madre on the shoal to serve as a permanent outpost. The move was intended to bolster Manila’s claims in the face of China’s expansive assertions over the region.

This latest incident adds to the growing list of confrontations between China and the Philippines. The strategic waterway, which sees trillions of dollars in trade pass through annually, is claimed in whole or in part by several nations, including China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. China’s extensive claims, marked by the so-called “nine-dash line,” have been a source of ongoing conflict and diplomatic friction.

International reactions to the incident have been swift. The United States, a vital ally of the Philippines, expressed “deep concern” over China’s actions. In a statement, the U.S. State Department reiterated its support for the Philippines and called for “an immediate end to coercive and dangerous behavior in the West Philippine Sea.” Other regional actors, including Japan and Australia, have also voiced their concerns, urging peaceful resolution and respect for international maritime laws.

As the Philippines and China navigate this latest crisis, the broader implications for regional security and international maritime conduct remain a pressing concern. The incident at Second Thomas Shoal is a stark reminder of the fragile and volatile nature of territorial disputes in the West Philippine Sea, highlighting the urgent need for diplomatic engagement and adherence to international norms.

The post China Coast Guard Blocks Medical Evacuation at Second Thomas Shoal first appeared on Zamboanga .

Turtle Island, Malaysia

Zamboanga del Sur -Three Chinese warships were intercepted by members of the Philippine Navy in the afternoon of June 6 and challenged via radio between the seas off Pilas Island and behind Santa Cruz Island. The Chinese Navy’s East Sea Fleet’s Duludao-class dispatch ship “Dong-Jiao 93” was one of the ships that was spotted. It was escorted by two amphibious transport ships, one named “Jinggang Shan” and bearing the pennant number 999, both of which were Type 071.

Lieutenant Commander Chester Cabaltera, operations officer of Westmincom’s Naval Forces, said their unit spotted the Chinese vessels and immediately reported the incident to the Western Mindanao Command’s public affairs office.

“We already coordinated with Western Mindanao Command’s PIO regarding this. The PLA Navy ships were transiting our area, observing their right to innocent passage, and they responded to our units through radio communication” Cabaltera explained.

The Naval Forces Western Mindanao described the two People’s Liberation Army Navy vessels as a training ship with bow number 83 and an amphibious transport dock with bow number 999.

“In accordance with standard operating procedure, the AFP dispatched BRP Domingo Deluana (PG-905) to shadow or monitor the passage of the two PLA Navy vessels. Our escorting vessel also issued a standard challenge to the Chinese warships,” the Armed Forces of the Philippines said in a statement. “One of the vessels, Qi Jiquang (BN-83) responded that it was conducting normal navigation from its last port of call in Dili, Timor Leste en route to Dalian, China,” the AFP said.

Netizens from Basilan said they had actually seen three Chinese naval ships.

The Basilan Strait, which connects the Sulu Sea to the Celebes Sea via the Moro Gulf, is recognized as an international sea lane where vessels from various nations may undertake innocent passage.

Article 19 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea says a passage may be deemed innocent “so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.” 

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